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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, EE Division

29 December 1952

ATTENTION : Mr. Peter Sichel

FROM : C (OC)

SUBJECT : Review of KIBITZ

REFERENCE : Your Memorandum dated 18 November 1952

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 DATE: 1/1/53 REVIEWER: C

1. C is to be commended for his usual outstanding professional effort in analyzing the KIBITZ program. The undersigned was fortunate in serving with C on the same field staff for some two years and has always been impressed with his shrewd and keen sense of analysis and intelligence.

2. While it is beyond my purview to comment concerning the many ramifications of the over-all KIBITZ program, I should like to say in terms of generality that I concur with C 's findings.

3. With specific reference to C 's observations concerning the communications aspects of the program, the following comments are forwarded for your information.

a. Re paragraph 43. Concur. The principle of utilizing females as radio operators has long been held sound by this office and expression of this belief has been lodged in a number of instances in the field. In the WE area, for example, where local government cooperation and the professional caliber of the personnel involved is most conducive to healthy stay-behinds, women have been used in a considerable number of cases in the role of stay-behind WT operators. In Germany, to my knowledge, the use of women as radio operators has been restricted to Berlin and certain peripheral P and P operations. The principle of using personnel who are stayable by virtue of job or physical infirmities also is held to be sound by this Office.

b. Re paragraph 44. Hop field wire (and poles) can be used for agent antennae. A special study is not, I believe, required. Any high frequency radio transmitter requires an antenna. The better this antenna is, in a technical sense, the better will be the communications which result. The antenna equipment now furnished as a standard item in agent equipment is made of fine-gauge, easy-to-handle, wire with neutral camouflage color covering (e.g. field gray). Agent antenna systems in operational use are of every conceivable length and height and operated under a variety of conditions. In some cases, quite satisfactory communications can be conducted with an antenna that is simply stretched over the surface of the ground. Agent antennas can be stretched between trees, between a house and a tree, within the attic or garret of a building and even around the molding of an inside room. The

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type and method of arrangement of an agent antenna is, in truth, an individual case problem. The principles of good antenna practice, as well as field expedients, are taught to agents during their training period. The operational situation and the imagination of the agent will, then, in the final analysis, determine what antenna will be used at any given time by a specific agent. Indigenous field wire, barbed wire fences, farming sticks and poles etc. can be used, and have been used, by agents. Study on antennae possibilities and cataloguing "live" cases is a continuing function of the Operations Division, Office of Communications.

c. Re paragraph 45. I suggest [] be consulted concerning evidence referred to in this paragraph. My personal opinion is that we shall always be saddled with the underground burial but that greater use - on a more effective basis - should be made of the above-ground cache. You will note that it has been, historically, the policy not to issue equipment to agents prior to an immediate requirement. This policy, long echoed by EE, forced the unduly heavy emphasis on neutral - and underground - burials. Underground "blind" burials leave much to be desired. Burial equipment and techniques are vastly better than they were four years ago but this does not alter the basic point that such burials do leave much to be desired. I cite the variations in techniques being applied in the WE area as being of interest to you.

d. Re paragraph 46. I concur. The matter of cipher security in this case is a problem of operational security rather than commo security. [] is suggested as a contributor. I have had a number of intensive discussions on this subject with our own field staffs as well as indigenous organizers in the WE area and shall be happy to participate in such a study.

e. Re paragraph 49. I am elated - and surprised - that [] has become convinced of the value of radio amateurs. Here, again, is an area of development long frowned upon policy-wise by this Headquarters but championed by Communications. You will, perhaps, recall discussions concerning categories of "use" staybehinds. Some years ago the basic concept advanced by the undersigned was categorizing on a time-phased basis : Phase A being those staybehinds to be activated for short and intensive use immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities and Phase B, the more classic, long-range strategic group. Hams lend themselves admirably to Phase A with considerably less outlay on our part and, concurrently, much greater communications efficiency than Phase B.

f. Paragraph 50. Concur. This matter is obviously of increasing importance in view of conditions developing in Germany.

4. The Office of Communications will be happy to participate in any studies or programs which may arise from this report or be incident to it.

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Acting Chief,
Plans and Policy Staff, OC

cc: FI/Plans []

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